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CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: ACKNOWLEDGING
UNCERTAINTY IN THE UNKNOWN
MARY MARGARET PENROSE
I. INTRODUCTION

Necessity never made a good bargain.
That which has never been tried or tested cannot be confidently, much
less boastfully, touted. In fact, something that has never occurred requires
careful assessment and often receives numerous differing predictions
regarding success and potential failure. In employing the scientific model,
one relies on a hypothesis to calculate what is most likely to occur. But law
does not use the true scientific method. Rather, law is as fluid and changing
as the participants who make and interpret it. 2 Thus, as the Article V issue
of a State-Convention process to amend the United States Constitution is
considered, all commentators on the topic must confess that the dialogue
being proffered is, at best, mere forecasting. In truth, as none of the
twenty-seven constitutional amendments have even been proffered through
the State-Convention method, even the most sage constitutional scholars are
at a loss to know, with any real precision, what will occur or which
* Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law. The author wishes to thank her
2009 and 2010 Constitutional Law classes for insisting that the Constitution is a fluid and
"living" document. Their faith in our democracy convinces me that our Constitution will live
on for generations to come. The author further wishes to thank the entire library staff at
Texas Wesleyan, with particular thanks to Laura Fargo, for their uncondititional research
assistance. Essays like this could not be drafted without the aid and support of librarians.
1. BENJAMIN FRANKLiN, POOR RIcHARD'S ALMANACK 10 (Blackwell North America,
Inc. 1987).
2. While Marbury v. Madison reminds that "it is emphatically the province and the
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," such declarations are far from static.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Society has, on occasion, witnessed radical
shifts in court doctrines over the period ofjust a few years. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States
Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) ( "[C]onstitutional convention route bristles with
unanswered questions."). Professor Gunther went further to proclaim his belief that "the
convention route promises uncertainty, controversy, and divisiveness at every turn." Id. at 5.
In closing his essay, Professor Gunther later confessed: "Everything I have said constitutes
conjecture about the past and advice about the future." Id at 25. See also Neal S. Manne,
Good Intentions, New Inventions, and Article V ConstitutionalConventions, 58 TEX. L. REV.
131, 135 (1979) ("For the constitutional law scholar, the consideration of the convention
alternative is a foray into conjecture and speculation.").
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bodies-executive, legislative or judicial-will actually be involved in the
process. 4
Much like Benjamin Franklin's admonishment, we must recognize that
going into an Article V State-Convention scenario without any Ruiding
principles could lead to a very unstable and unpredictable outcome. While
this is not, in itself, problematic, legislatures and judges should heed the
warning: "necessity never made a good bargain."6
In this short Essay, I will respond to the honorable Michael Stern's
article-Reopening the Constitutional Road to Reform: Toward a
SafeguardedArticle V Convention7 --that assures us there is nothing to fear

from the State-Convention process. While this is surely one approach, I
believe it to be too trusting, if not naive, in light of our constitutional
history. With literally nothing serving as our compass, we risk the creation
of rules that will undoubtedly be borne out of necessity. If nothing changes
to guide the process, we can only hope that those in power during such an
unprecedented and momentous undertaking will make wise and limited
decisions. But, as this Essay demonstrates, there is nothing mandating such
behavior. The State-Convention model has never been tested or used.
Therefore, no one can be certain that upon its invocation either the
procedures utilized or the outcomes reached will be moderate or even
moderated.
II. VISIONARY IDEAS -

SHORT ON DETAIL

[Olne cannot work in constitutionallaw for long without appreciating
the hazards ofguesses about the future.8

4. See Gunther, supra note 3, at 10. Professor Gunther observed that it remains "a
real question as to whether the courts would consider this an area in which they could
intervene; other aspects of the amendment process have been held by the courts to raise nonjusticiable questions." Id. Professor Gunther's further concern is expressed as follows:
In any event, the prospect of [any] lawsuit simply adds to the potentially
divisive confrontations along the convention road-a confrontation between
Court and Congress, to go with the possible other confrontations, between
Congress and the convention, between Congress and the states, and perhaps
between the Supreme Court and the states.
Id.
5. Id. at 10-11. Professor Gunther admonished that the State-Convention method, in
its current from without any guiding principles "[I]s a road that promises controversy and
confusion and confrontation at every turn." Id. at 25.
6. FRANKLIN, supra note 2, at 10.
7. Michael Stem, Reopening the Constitutional Road to Reform: Toward a
SafeguardedArticle V Convention, 78 TENN. L. REv. 765 (2011).
8. Gunther, supra note 3, at 1.
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The Constitutional Convention that brought forth the United States
Constitution was as visionary as it was revolutionary.9 Historians and
statesmen continue to revel in the Constitution's enduring value, its historic
brilliance, and legal sustainability. Foremost among the visionary
components of the Constitution is the recognition that to endure, the
document must be capable of change.'o Change was explicitly provided for
in the Constitution through the amendment process in Article V.,
However, necessarily lacking in this otherwise visionary proposal is any
detailed provision for how the State-Convention option should logistically
operate.
Article V reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall
be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by the
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress .... 13
And, while this language provides certain mathematical provisions that
many Americans find familiar (because generally it takes two-thirds to
propose and three-fourths to ratify) any guiding principles are patently
lacking. Thus, the fear of a "runaway convention" appears at least as
rationally based as the confidence shown by those debunking the idea of a
"runaway convention." In truth, both arguments are mere prognostication
and neither can be supported with traditional authority. There are few cases
on these issues, and the cases that do exist are inconclusive and, at times,
inconsistent. This schism exists simply because the State-Convention model
has never been used, never been tested, and presents Americans with the
potential, just as real as any other alternative, that a radical StateConvention paradigm could rethink the entire United States Constitution. 14
Historically, the Framers' debate seemed to evidence concern that the
amendment process not be entirely placed with either the individual states
or the national government. Members of the Constitutional Convention
9. See Ralph R. Martig, Amending the Constitution,Article Five: The Keystone of the
Arch, 35 MICH. L. REv. 1253, 1253-57 (1936).
10. See id.at 1253.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
12. See Clifton McCleskey, Along the Midway: Some Thoughts on Democratic
Constitution Amending, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1003 (1967).
13. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
14. See Martig,supra note 9, at 1256 ("There can be no doubt that [the Constitutional]
convention, by proceeding to draft a new frame of government, exceeded its powers; these
were explicit and confined to the sole purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation.").
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evidenced distrust for any one government being the sole repositor for the
Amendment process. Thus, after much crafting and compromise,' Article
V, in its current form, was presented and ratified without much fanfare. To
date, Article V has been used twenty-seven times, though the first twelve
amendments were passed nearly contemporaneously with the original
Constitution.16 At other times, like in the Civil-War era, Amendments were
passed in a grouping of just a few years.' 7 Then, there is the Twentyseventh Amendment, which, curiously enough, was originally offered in
1789 and deemed ratified in 1992."

Furthermore, all twenty-seven Amendments except the Twent7-first
Amendment were actually ratified by the State-Legislature model.' That
15. See Manne, supra note 3, at 142-46.
16. See Martig, supra note 9, at 1266; see also Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Article V: The
Comatose Article of our Living Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REv. 931, 931 (1967) ("[L]ay[]
aside the ten in the Bill of Rights, which were really a continuation of the original process of
constitution-making .... .").
17. See Dixon, supra note 16, at 931 ("[T]he three Civil War amendments, which were
part of the unique process of reformation of the Union. . . ."); see also Manne, supra note 3,
at 132-33 ("This paucity of formal change appears more acute if one considers, entirely
reasonably, the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights) to have been a continuation of the
original process of constitution making. Three other amendments (the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth) originated in the aftermath of the Civil War, and reform following
military suppression of revolution does not fit very neatly into traditional doctrines of
American constitutionalism. Two amendments-the Prohibition and repeal amendmentseffectively cancel each other out.").
18. Congress presented the Twenty-seventh Amendment with twelve other
amendments. See VARAT, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 16 n.1 (12th
ed. 2006). In 1791, ten of the twelve amendments were ratified and comprise what is now
considered the "Bill of Rights." Id. In 1992, the thirty-eighth state, Michigan, finally ratified
the Twenty-seventh amendment, reaching the requisite three-fourths states needed for the
Amendment to take effect. Id. There remains, however, some controversy as to whether the
twenty-seventh Amendment is truly part of the Constitution. See id
19. See Amendment of the Constitution by the Convention Method Under Article V,
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY COMM., at 1-2 (1973);
see also Martig, supra note 9, at 1270 (commenting that one of the founders, Senator Ferry
of Connecticut, cautioned that the convention method was not preferable because
conventions are "dilatory, expensive, and unwise"). In an admonishment that remains
timely, and apropos to the question at hand regarding State Conventions, Senator Ferry
warned:
If a convention is once assembled you cannot limit its power to the simple
amendment which you are proposing to it. It may go on to amend your State
constitution and to subvert the whole machinery of your State government,
and there is no power in your State to stop it.
Id. at 1272. Martig also explained that "[iun submitting the Twenty-first Amendment,
Congress failed to provide any regulation for the calling and supervising of the conventions,
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amendment, the lone and anomalous amendment ratified through the StateConvention mode of unfortunately offered little guidance.
There is no discernable reason that the States have never reached the
required two-thirds mandated for Congress to call an Article V
Convention. 2 0 Every state has at one time or another petitioned Congress to
call an Article V Convention. 2 1 The states have been close to reaching the
requisite number and continue, even today, to send resolutions calling for
an Article V Constitutional Convention. 2 But, having come up short on
every occasion, the State-Convention procedure has never been tested.
While it is likely that most, beyond legislators and constitutional
scholars, are unaware of the State-Convention model, society must be
prepared to address this contingency should it occur. Presuming, for present
purposes, that at some point in the future the State-Convention method will
be used, I must respectfully disagree with Stem in his assessment that
sufficient safeguards currently exist. I also disagree that the primary
controversy is whether a convention will be limited to considering only
discretely proposed amendments.23
Instead, I perceive the controversy as being much broader in scope and
the challenges ahead much more deeply imbedded in our constitutional
fabric. I believe the controversy, at its core, concerns the distribution of
power and decision-making. Who will be the final arbiter of controversies?
Who will control the process, including the selection of convention
members, and the limitation, if any, of the State-Convention agenda? 24 In
the final analysis, I believe it imperative that proactive steps be taken now
to prepare for what will surely confront us later, and, all too possibly, catch

and the matter of details was left to the states." Id. at 1274.
20. As one author has noted, the State-Convention model under Article V has become
little more than a "protest clause." Dixon, supra note 16, at 944. In discussing Article V,
Professor Dixon further posits that it is "understandable that the convention device has never
been used; piecemeal constitutional revision, which is all the people have ever desired, is
more expeditiously handled by congressional initiation." Id.
21. See Amendment of the Constitution by the Convention Method Under Article V,
supra note 19, at 2.
22. See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE
CONSTITUTION By NATIONAL CONvENTION 76, 83 (1988); Ronnie Ellis, State Lawmakers
Call for a Constitutional Convention, THE DAILY INDEPENDENT (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://dailyindependent.com/local/x62852616/State-lawmakers-call-for-constitutional
-convention; Christian Gomez, Texas State Senate Calls for Con-Con, NEW AMERICAN (Feb.
28, 2011, 8:52 AM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/politics/6474texas-state-senate-calls-for-con-con.
23. See Stem, supra note 7, at 766-67.
24. See Manne, supra note 3, at 145. Manne writes that Madison himself worried
about the procedural matters relating to Article V. Id. ("Madison did not object to the

provision for a convention, but noted the problems that might arise over form, quorum, and
procedural matters . . . ."). Id.
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us unaware. If we wait until the moment is upon us, I fear that the necessity
of the moment will strike a very bad bargain.
III. PAST PROPOSALS FOR PROACTIVE STEPS

There arefew articles of the Constitutionas importantto the
continued viability of our government and nation as Article V 25
These twenty-one words introduced one of the most thoughtful and
prestigious studies to have evaluated the Article V State-Convention
model.26 As the states had come close on many occasions to forcing
Congress to call for a State Convention, the American Bar Association
("ABA") in August 1973 proposed a series of procedures that would
delimit the various powers of those individuals and entities most likely to
be involved in the State-Convention process.27 These ABA suggestions,
which responded to U.S. Senator Sam Ervin's twice-unsuccessful Senate
Bill addressing Article V, continue to provide a very tempered approach to
dealing, in advance of necessity, with the State-Convention model.'8
The ABA Committee was comprised of three judges,2 9 a law school
dean,3 0 a law professor,3 and various other well-respected lawyers.32 The
Committee formed and considered a variety of questions33 that, I believe,
remain open questions under any Article V analysis, including:

25. Amendment of the Constitution by the Convention Method Under Article V, supra
note 19, at 1.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 5-6.
28. See id. at 4. Senator Ervin's proposed bill is contained in Appendix A to the ABA
study. Id. at 47-57. The ABA Committee went to great lengths to consider, and attempt to
improve through their Study, the Ervin proposal. See id.
29. See id. at iii-iv. The Honorable Sarah T. Hughes, a United States District Judge in
Dallas, Texas, oft remembered as the judge that swore in Lyndon B. Johnson on an airplane
in Dallas, Texas, after the death of President John F. Kennedy, was the lone federal judicial
representative. The Honorable William S. Thompson, a Superior Court Judge from the
District of Columbia, and the Honorable C. Clyde Atkins, United States District Judge were
the other judicial representatives. See id. at iii-iv, ix-x.
30. Dean Albert M. Sacks was the Dean of Harvard Law School at the time. See id. at
Ill.

31. Professor David Dow of the University of Nebraska College of Law was
previously the Dean of Nebraska's College of Law. See id. at iii, ix-x.
32. The remaining panel members included: Warren Christopher, Esq., of Los
Angeles, California; John D. Feerick, Esq., of New York, New York; Adrian M. Foley, Jr.,
Esq., of Newark, New Jersey; and, Samuel W. Witwer, Esq., of Chicago, Illinois. See id. at
ill-iv.
33. See id. at ix.
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1) If the legislatures of two-thirds of the states apply for a convention
limited to a specific matter, must Congress call such a convention?;
2) If a convention is called, is the limitation binding on the convention?;
3) What constitutes a valid application which Congress must count and
who is to judge its validity?;
4) What is the length of time in which applications for a convention will
be counted?;
5) How much power does Congress have as to the scope of a convention?
As to procedures such as the selection of delegates? As to the voting
requirements at a convention? As to refusing to submit to the states for
ratification the product of a convention?;
6) What are the roles of the President and state governors in the amending
process?;
7) Can a state legislature withdraw an application for a convention once it
has been submitted to Congress or rescind a previous ratification of a
proposed amendment or a previous rejection?;
8) Are issues arising in the convention process justiciable?;
9) Who is to decide questions of ratification?34
These are just a few of the more pressing questions that will eventually
require resolution when the Article V State-Convention method is finally
utilized, if ever it is. 35 One thing is certain: there will be tension between
the individual states and national government. If there had been consensus
on an issue, it would have been addressed by the national government and,
more precisely, by Congress without the need for intervention by two-thirds
of the States. The purpose of including the State-Convention method in
Article V is to provide the individual states with the power to amend when
the national government refuses to act.36 Thus, if we ever reach this point,
34.

Id. at 5.

35.

See McCleskey, supra note 12, at 1003. In addition to the questions posed by the

ABA Committee Study, Professor McCleskey notes the "many detailed questions of

concern" that will inevitably arise under the State-Convention method, including:
May a governor exercise his veto power to block legislative ratification? Who
decides how a [State] convention is to be created and organized? May a
popular vote be substituted for ratification by legislative or convention
action? ... Are there limits on the subjects that may properly be dealt with by
amendment? May Congress incorporate a time limit for consideration in a
proposed amendment? Does the President have any formal role in the process
of initiating proposals?
Id.

36. See Gunther, supra note 3, at 17. Professor Gunther explained that what he thought

"[t]he framers had primarily in mind, then, was that the states should have an opportunity to
initiate the constitutional revision process if Congress became unresponsive, arrogant and
tyrannical." Id. Professor Gunther later underscores this point by stating that "[i]f the stateinitiated method for amending the Constitution was designed for anything, it was designed to
minimize the role of Congress." Id. at 23.
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we should expect a fierce power struggle between the state and national
governments.
Textually, Article V has all the necessary ingredients for a perfect
constitutional storm.37 The textual language implies a power-sharing
arrangement, but the most irm ortant details-including the issue of judicial
review-are notably absent. Furthermore, depending on the issue serving
as impetus for the State-Convention method, one cannot anticipate whether
the federal courts will intervene or whether the executive will try to
participate.
Senator Ervin, and subsequently Senator Helms, both
attempted during the 1970s to exercise "jurisdiction stripping" of Article V
assessments from any court, state or federal, in their proposed Senate
bills. 4 0 It is unclear whether, even without a "jurisdiction-stripping"
provision, any congressional attempt to proactively delineate the parameters
of Article V would qualify as a non-justiciable political question.
Accordingly, we should follow the lead of the ABA Committee and
Senators Ervin and Helms and recommend that some standards be enacted
to safeguard the essence of Article V's mandate. 4 1 The text, standing alone,
is ambiguous and vulnerable to manipulation. Unlike Stern, I do not believe
there are sufficient safeguards in place.
IV. TEXTUAL LIMITATIONS - AMBIGUITY IN SEARCH OF RESOLUTION
The logical startingpoint in this endeavor is the text ofArticle V,for its
deceptively plain language conceals an array of ambiguities.42
Professor McCleskey accurately depicts Article V as "deceptively
plain" and yet, simultaneously ambiguous.43 The words seem clear enough,
but the text is rife with uncertainty. Numerous unanswered questions
remain. Madison himself recorded concern in his personal notes: How was
a State Convention to be formed? By what rule, or rules, would decisions
be reached? What would be the force of State Convention's acts?"
37. See Manne, supra note 3, at 135. Manne predicts that "[a] general article V
convention, more than any other event possible in our political system, has the potential for a
complete reworking of the rules by which government exercises its power." Id.
38. See id ("For the constitutional law scholar, the consideration of the convention
alternative is a foray into conjecture and speculation. The method has never been used, and
the text, history and policy considerations relating to the convention method are all less than
unambiguous").
39. Cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
40. See Gunther, supra note 3, at 21-22. Professor Gunther described the "jurisdiction
stripping" component of the "Ervin-Helms" proposals to be filled with "grave constitutional
doubts." Id. at 21.
41. See id.
42. McCleskey, supra note 12, at 1003.
43. Id.
44. See Manne, supra note 3, at 144-45.
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Additionally, "[t]here was no mention of the scope of applications or
conventions at any time during debate over the amendment process at the
Philadelphia Convention. Contempor[aneous] commentary on these issues
was noticeably lacking."4 5
One thing is clear, however, from Article V's text: the design suggests
an equal opportunity between the state and national governments for the
proposing of constitutional amendments.4 Beyond that, however, there is
little textual guidance provided.47 Congress, ultimately, is a necessary
participant in any State-Convention process on at least two levels: first, in
determining that the criteria have been satisfied requiring the calling of a
Constitutional Convention and, second, in determining whether any
proposals deemed to conform with Article V should be submitted to
ratification by state legislative vote or further convention.48
These are the two textual roles that the national Congress must fill.
However, as the ABA Committee appreciates, there are innumerable
opportunities for mischief in filling those textually commanded roles.4 ' The
best occasion for curtailing any politically or constitutionally damaging
machinations is in advance of any crisis.o If we wait until the crisis is upon
us, the various players, both local and national, will be motivated more by
the power struggle at hand and less by the constitutional mandates
envisioned under Article V.
Stern suggests that while "the text is silent as to what amendments the
convention may propose" among other details, we can simply turn to logic
to infer solutions. 5 1 He deftly explains that the textual language provides
clues, or expectations, as to what should occur upon the calling of an
Article V Convention.52 My concern is that Stern proffers only one
interpretation of language that is anything but historically clear. For each
45. Id at 146.
46. See Martig,supra note 9, at 1258-61.
47. See Gunther, supra note 3, at 23 ("Congress was only given two responsibilities
under [the State Convention] portion of Article V" and, he believed, "that, properly
construed, these are extremely narrow responsibilities.").
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 24 (calling on Congress to address these issues that are "long overdue").
Professor Gunther further opines that: "If there is merit to my tale of confusion and
uncertainty, Congress surely owes it to the country to consider the differing views about
Article V and to clarify the misimpressions under which so many state legislatures may have
[already] acted." Id.
51. Stem, supra note 7, at 772.
52. See id. at 774-75 (discussing Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory ofArticle
V: The ConstitutionalLessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 738,
740 (1993)).
53. See Manne, supra note 3, at 148 (observing that "[t]he most striking thing about
this scholarly analysis of history, frequently couched in terms of the 'intent of the framers'
... is not that there should be such irreconcilable disagreement, but that there should be this
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article that suggests that an Article V State Convention poses no threat to
our constitutional integrity and that the "solutions" to such Convention are
discemable, there is another warning of the perils inherent in the StateConvention model.54
While I will refrain from entering the debate as to whether the calling
of an Article V State Convention is prudential or risky, I do believe that
pressing forward without some textual resolution or instruction, such as a
legislative mandate or judicial pronouncement, will yield a troubled StateConvention process. The ABA Committee's Study referenced above
provides an exceptional opportunity to revisit this longstanding issue and
work toward implementable solutions.ss The debates that continue have not
provided tangible solutions and I am not convinced that these writings
clearly define the outstanding issues. Instead, our writings are academic, in
the purest and most literal sense. They are predictive. They are historical.
They are even entertaining.56 While these writings might be influential to
those ultimately called upon to resolve the Article V issue, I would
welcome a change of focus from debating what we are certain will occur,
based on textual expectations or interpretations, to a call for action
demanding counsel as to how to conduct ourselves when the StateConvention moment is finally upon us.s?
The text itself is neither dispositive nor necessarily informative in the
constitutional sense. If the devil is in the details, then it is little wonder that
the text of Article V bedevils all who strive to distill its true meaning and
predict its future application.

proliferation of [opposing] statements of what history 'clearly demonstrates' at all").
54. See id. at 146-47 (cataloguing the varying positions of scholars).
55. But see Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a
Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1972) (calling the development of proactive
legislation similar to the failed bills advanced by Senators Ervin and Helms in the 1970s as
"a national calamity").
56. See Manne, supra note 3, at 149-56. Perhaps the most entertaining presentation of
the Article V quagmire is Manne's "Play in One Act" entitled "The Second Coming of
Thomas Jefferson." In this play, set forth within his larger article, Manne posits a ghostly
meeting between Professor Charles L. Black and Thomas Jefferson to discern the deeper
meanings of Article V.
57. But see Black, supra note 55, at 194. Admittedly, Professor Black takes the exact
opposite position. Professor Black would counsel against any proactive legislation noting
that "[i]t is most unwise to try to settle such questions at a time when national attention is not
and cannot be keenly focused upon them, and intense national debate be thus generated." Id.
Unlike the approach recommended in the current article, Black would rather wait for the
crisis, constitutional though it may become, and allow the attendant focused debate and
national attention to moderate behavior. My thesis differs in that I fear such a situation
would likely yield emotional solutions as opposed to rational decisions devoid of emotion.
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V. CURRENT "SAFEGUARDS" - SUPREME CONFUSION?
The question of justiciability pervades the discussion of all the above
issues. How these controversies are ultimately resolved may depend more
on who decides them than on the textual considerationsjust discussed or
the historicaland policy considerationsthat follow. Article V is silent on
the issue ofjusticiability.Absent a cleargrant or denial ofjudicial review,
the question ofjusticiability is, by its nature, a policy issue. One should
note that, in theory at least, each Article V question presents a separate
issue as to justiciability;some might be heldjusticiablewhile others might
not.58

Issues surrounding Article V and the State-Convention method are not
completely foreign to the United States Supreme Court. In fact, former
Chief Justice Rehnquist provided tangential insight into the Article V
process as recently as 1989.59 As we move toward an eventual
confrontation with Article V's State-Convention model, we must be
forward thinking in our desire to add clarity to the process. Rather than
remain comfortable debating the potential breadth of any State Convention,
scholars and legislators should join forces to provide a solution to what
remains an obvious quandary. The guidance provided by the Supreme
Court is neither definitive nor clear and only adds to the lingering
confusion. Will this be an area where, ultimately, the Court will "say what
the law is?"60
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court had two occasions to decipher Article
V's amendment process. In 1920, the Court presented a thorough
interpretation of Article V's ratification provisions in Hawke v. Smith.6' The
discrete question presented was whether the state of Ohio could, through
State Constitutional provision, mandate a voter referendum for ratification
purposes.62 In finding the voter ratification method in conflict with Article
V, Justice Day explained that "[t]he act of ratification by the state derives
its authority from the federal Constitution to which the state and its people
have alike assented."63 The Court also reminded, "[i]t is not the function of
courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to alter the method which the
Constitution has fixed.'64

58. Manne, supra note 3, at 141-42.
59. See Uhler v. Am. Fed. of Labor-Cong. of Indus. Org., 468 U.S. 1310, 1312 (1989).
60. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). While Marbury certainly
established the notion of judicial review, other principles, including the concept of
justiciability and the political question doctrine, often operate to curtail the power of judicial
review.
61. See generally Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
62. See id. at 231.
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id. at 227.
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Accordingly, the Court struck down the Ohio attempt at voter
ratification finding that the Framers did not intend for the people, acting
individually as such, to play any role in Article V's ratification process.
Rather,
The fifth article is a grant of authority by the people to Congress. The
determination of the method of ratification is the exercise of a national
power specifically granted by the Constitution; that power is conferred
upon Congress, and is limited to two methods, by action of the
Legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or conventions in a like number
of states. The framers . . . might have adopted a different method.

Ratification might have been left to a vote of the people, or to some
authority of government other than that selected. The language of the
article [on this point] is plain, and admits of no doubt in its
interpretation.66
Thus, the first case directly addressing the role of the people in Article
V found that the historical meaning of "legislatures" was clear. 67
Legislatures, when used in the Constitution, mean those elected officials
that serve as representatives of the people. As Justice Day reminds, when
the framers "intended that direct action by the people should be had they
were no less accurate in the use of apt phraseology to carry out such
purpose."6 9
What does Hawke add to this discussion? The Court had no trouble
reaching a merits-based decision regarding Article V. In fact, the Court was
willing to tell "the people" that their legislatures could, in fact, bind them to
decisions without requiring any direct input from their citizens. Ohioans, as
a people, were displeased that their legislature was capable of binding them
to the Eighteenth Amendment. But, Hawke had little difficulty sanctioning
the legislative ratification process. 70 Article V's ratification provisions were
deemed to be clear, unambiguous and, most importantly, to exclude any
role of the people, individually or directly. 7 1 We can interpret Hawke as
allowing the Court to resolve Article V power struggles between state
citizens and their state legislative representatives. Further, Hawke
underscores that at least some provisions within Article V are subject to
judicial review.
Two years later, the Court addressed the question of whether the
Nineteenth Amendment had become part of the federal Constitution in

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id.
Id. (intemal citation omitted).
See id.
See id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
See id.
See id.
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Leser v. Garnett.7 2 Maryland sought to disqualify Cecilia Streett Waters and
Mary D. Randolph from exercising their right of suffrage recently
guaranteed by the Nineteenth Amendment. In presenting its case to the
Court, Maryland first suggested that the substantive requirements of the
Nineteenth Amendment, giving women the right to vote, would, "if made
without the State's consent, destroy[] its autonomy as a political body."7 4
Justice Brandeis and the Court reminded Maryland that its previous refusal
to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment, providing black males the right to vote,
also did not prevent that Amendment from taking effect in every state,
including Maryland.75 Maryland's second challenge, like that presented in
Hawke, was that because of numerous state constitutional prohibitions, state
legislatures are prohibited from acting for the people in ratifying
amendments to the Constitution.7 6 Justice Brandeis, much like Justice Day,
reminded that:
[T]he function of a state Legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to
the federal Constitution, like the function of Congress in proposing the
amendment, is a federal function derived from the federal Constitution;
and it transcends any limitation sought to be imposed by the people of a
state.
Hence, Leser, like Hawke, reminds that the Supreme Court may invoke its
power to enforce Article V's provisions on the people of an objecting state.
A merits-based review of Article V is certainly possible for any StateConvention question. Leser and Hawke also appear to be cases upholding
Article V's structural components. If a reviewing court finds that questions
relating to the State-Convention model are structural, or that the Framers'
intent on the particular question is clearly discernable, there is little doubt
that the Court has the power, precedentially as well as jurisprudentially, to
resolve the controversy. However, neither Leser nor Hawke lends any
insight into a situation where the question is not as clearly presented or as
clearly defined.
The most troubling case casting its shadow upon Article V is Coleman
v. Miller.78 Coleman considered the Supreme Court's ability to intervene in
the amendment process under Article V where Congress had acted. In
reaching its decision that the issue of whether a State's ratification of a

72. See 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922).
73. See id at 135-36.
74. Id. at 136.
75. See id. "That the Fifteenth is valid, although rejected by six states including
Maryland, has been recognized and acted on for half a century." Id. (citations omitted).
76. See id. at 136-37.
77. Id. at 137.
78. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
79. See id.
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Congressionally proposed amendment80 was valid, despite an individual
state's initial rejection and subsequent ratification, the Court announced
that:
[W]e think that the Congress in controlling the promulgation of the
adoption of a constitutional amendment has the final determination of the
question whether by lapse of time its proposal of the amendment had lost
its vitality prior to the required ratifications. 8 1
While the Court refused to rule directly on whether the various Article
V issues constituted non-justiciable political questions, having been divided
on the issue, 82 the decision is replete with language deferring to the national
Congress." Four Justices agreed that the issues presented were non84
justiciable political questions, but failed to command a majority view.
Thus, there is uncertainty as to whether a modem court would be receptive
to resolving an Article V challenge where the claim involves the role of
Congress, like that addressed in Coleman,85 or would find that such
question was a non-justiciable political question. While Leser and Hawke
contemplate an active decisional role for the Court, Coleman creates an
element of doubt in the equation.
Over fifty years later, Chief Justice Rehnquist, sitting as Circuit Justice,
refused to issue a stay intervening in the California controversy as to
80. Coleman involved the State of Kansas' initial rejection and subsequent ratification
of the Child Labor Amendment. Id. at 435-36.
81. Id. at 456.
82. See id. at 447 ("Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a
question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which
the Court is equally divided and therefore the Court expresses no opinion on that point.").
83. Id. at 450. The Court, deferring completing to the national Congress for resolution
of the ratification decision opined:
We think that in accordance with this historic precedent the question of the
efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous rejection
or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining
to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the
exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the
amendment.
Id.
84. See Uhler v. Am. Fed. of Labor-Congress of Indust. Orgs., 468 U.S. 1310, 1312
(1989) ("[Flour Justices of the Court adopted the position that the Court lacked jurisdiction
to rule on questions arising in connection with the ratification of a constitutional amendment
because all such questions were 'political' in nature. But that position did not command a
majority in Coleman .... ).
85. See Coleman, 397 U.S. at 433.
86. See Lesser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
87. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433.
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whether the voters could require their state legislators to join in the call for
an Article V State Convention." The basis for the refusal, set forth in a
brief three-page opinion, was that California had provided an independent
and adequate state ground for reaching its decision and, therefore, the
Supreme Court should not intercede. Justice Rehnquist did, however,
provide some illuminating dicta as to the political question doctrine,
predicting that neither state nor federal courts would be completely
powerless in addressing all Article V issues.90
Four Supreme Court opinions, spanning nearly 100 years, have yielded
little in the way of resolving the potential Article V controversies that the
State-Convention model presents. , In fact, most of the questions presented
in the ABA Committee Study were not addressed by the Court, as the two
most recent decisions were resolved without clearly delineating the role of
the states, Congress, or, equally important, the judiciary, in any
forthcoming Article V State-Convention process. 92 The soft doctrines of
justiciability and political question provide the Court with an opportunity to
remove itself from any particular and divisive issue. Precisely because
these doctrines are "soft" and malleable, one cannot predict with much
certainty that the Court will rebuff, or receive, any particular challenger if
the Court deems intervention necessary or the Constitutional issue
paramount.94 Thus, relying on the Court as an arbiter in this arena is
speculative and risky.9 With no clarity in reach, Article V presents the
opportunity for Supreme confusion.
88. See Uhler, 468 U.S. at 1312.
89. See id.at 1311.
90. See id at 1312.
91. See Manne, supra note 3, at 157. "The resolution of the scope issue, and other
article V questions as well, may hinge on who decides them." Id.
92. The role of the President under Article V was narrowed by the Supreme Court in
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378 (1798). The Hollingsworth holding was expanded
from its facts by the Court in Hawke which exclaimed that "[a]t an early day this court
settled that the submission of a constitutional amendment did not require the action of the
President." Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920).
93. Of course, the mere existence of these doctrines does not mean the Court will
invoke them. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (where the Court addressed the Florida
vote controversy without ever addressing the issues of standing, ripeness, political question,
or adequate and independent state grounds).
94. See id.
95. The state courts, however, have played a more vibrant role in interpreting Article
V's parameters. In 1996, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the call for a convention
"must come from the Legislature acting freely and without restriction or limitation, [and not
directly] from the people through their initiative power." See In re Initiative Petition No.
364, 930 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1996). In doing so, the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down the
voter-driven initiative to instruct the Oklahoma legislature to call for a federal constitutional
convention. Id. at 191. The case involved a proposed initiative that would have instructed the
legislature to call for a national constitutional convention addressing legislative term limits.
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V. CONCLUSION

Everything I have saidconstitutes conjecture about the past and advice
about thefuture.97
Professor Gerald Gunther uttered these words delivering a speech in
1979. The sentiments, though not my own, are as potent a closing vehicle
for me as they were for Professor Gunther over thirty years ago. Humility
requires that I confess my writing, though well intended and, hopefully,
equally well researched, is as speculative as any other on the topic of
Article V. Rather than press forward in the certainty that any entity will
adopt my interpretation on Article V, I can only hope to give advice as to
how future actors should address the topic.
Much like Professor Gunther and the ABA Committee, I urge Congress
to be proactive. Legislation defining the parameters of an Article V StateConvention scenario should be considered now, well in advance of any
need or crisis mandating a particular response to a particular topic.99 The
worst-case scenario, in my opinion, is not finding ourselves without an
answer as to whether any State Convention under Article V will be limited
or unlimited, but rather finding ourselves face to face with an Article V
State Convention without procedures specifying the roles of the various
players. The value in proactively establishing convention procedures is that
such advance directives should eliminate tying any power struggle with a
particular topic, such as abortion, school prayer, or a federal balanced
budget amendment. Procedures enacted in a hostile environment will be
influenced as much by emotion as by reason.
The template needed for such proactive legislation is already in draft
form, though substantial reconsideration must be given to the failed bills of
Senators Ervin and Helms. 00 Therefore, I would recommend that Congress
create an Article V sub-committee, with equal House and Senate
The Supreme Court of Arkansas and the United States District Court of Maine followed this
same approach in 1996 and 1997, respectively. See Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119 (Ark.
1996); League of Women Voters of Me. v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52 (Me. 1997).
96. See Manne, supra note 3, at 157 ("[A]ny argument regarding justiciability, no
matter how well reasoned, can be made instantly wrong by five Justices.").
97. Gunther, supranote 3, at 25.
98. Id. at 1. Professor Gunther, who at the time was teaching at Stanford University's
Law School, delivered the John A. Sibley Lecture in Law at the University of Georgia
School of Law on May 24, 1979, and his comments were ultimately set forth in an essay
format by the Law Review. Id.
99. But see Black, supra note 55, at 195 ("These problems can and should be solved
when they arrive, by the Congress empowered to solve them, and on the basis of all the
factors now unknowable and then existing."). Black's approach assumes a fact that this
author neither concedes nor embraces: that the parameters of Article V will be for Congress,
rather than the courts, state legislatures or executive, to decide.
100. See Gunther,supra note 3, at 21.
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membership, to work in concert with the American Law Institute and the
American Bar Association to create balanced and moderate procedures that
would govern any Article V State Convention. Much like the previous ABA
0 a modern committee should include jurists, academics, and
Committee,'o
lawyers of the highest quality and experience. Additionally, the American
Law Institute has proven itself adept at facing and proposing considered
resolution for tough legal issues. 102
Space prevents me from setting forth a detailed proposal of what items
should be considered or how such sub-committee would function. But, then
again, perhaps the details are best left to a sub-committee once created.
While I would not confine any potential Article V sub-committee to a
discrete series of questions for resolution, I would be remiss if I did not
suggest that the 1973 ABA Committee's Study' 0 3 provides an excellent
template of where to begin. The consideration of those questions evaluated
by the ABA Committee in 1973,'0 all still being unresolved, provides an
excellent starting place.
In the end, I confess to caring less about the detail of what items are
considered in any particular order. Instead, I am more concerned that a
deliberate, proactive consideration of the relevant procedural issues takes
place well in advance of any Article V State Convention. The importance of
having sound procedures in place prior to the invocation of Article V
assures all that the power struggle between state and national governments
the framers sought to avoid actually can be avoided. Despite Stern's
confidence in our government to adequately confront an Article V State
Convention, I fear any bargain borne out of necessity.
The time for action is now. For if there is one truism of constitutional
law it is that the textual vacuum of a constitutional provision will be filled
by something. 0 5 I harbor grave concerns about not only what will fill the
Article V void, but also who will ultimately make that decision.
Benjamin Franklin was a very wise man. Necessity, as we know, never
made a good bargain.'0 6 Let us avoid that necessity and strive to fill the
Article V void now. If we wait, having literally had centuries to resolve
these issues, we deserve the "bargain" that befalls us.

101. See Amendment of the Constitution by the Convention Method Under Article V,
supranote 19, at 1.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
106. FRANKLIN, supra note 1, at 10.

